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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

:

Case No. 880493-CA

t

JOHN LANCE HICKS,

»

Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from defendant's conviction on two
counts of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled
Substance in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County.
As the conviction is for felonies which are not first degree or
capital, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following provisions:
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp.
1988)
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986)
(Supp. 1988)
Utah Code Ann. S 72-2-303(1) (1978) (Supp.
1988)
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
(1988)

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the opportunity afforded to defendant to commit
a criminal offense was presented so as to not constitute
governmental entrapment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about December 4, 1984, defendant was charged
with four counts of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a
Controlled Substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii)f to wit: cocaine on three counts and marijuana on one
count.

The four violations occurred between September 5, 1984

and October 11, 1984.

Defendant Jake Larimoref aka Jacob Cramer

Larimore, aka John Lance Hicks was subsequently arrested and had
counsel make an initial appearance for him.

Defendant then

failed to appear for the preliminary hearing which was scheduled
for January 29, 1985.

Three and one-half years later, defendant

was apprehended in Salt Lake City and held on the charges
alleged.
On April 12, 1988 at the preliminary hearing, counts I
and II of the information filed against defendant were dismissed
because the confidential informant, Charles Scott, used to make
the controlled buys could not be found to testify (R. 22). Soon
after the preliminary hearing, defendant made a motion to dismiss
based upon the defense of entrapment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 76-2-303.

The motion and case were heard by the Honorable Pat

Brian on May 20, and June 21, 1988. After hearing testimony and
closing remarks, Judge Brian denied the motion to dismiss and
found defendant guilty on two counts of Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (R. 89).

Defendant's appeal followed on August 16, 1988, based
upon Judge Brian's refusal to find entrapment in the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the entrapment hearing, facts regarding the
circumstances relating to the drug buys resulting in defendant's
arrest came to light and are of factual importance to this
appeal.

During Mid-August through October of 1984, Officer Lloyd

Hansen was involved in an undercover narcotics investigation in
Summit County (R. 97 at 155). During that investigation, Officer
Hansen used a confidential informant, Charles Scott, to work with
him in the Park City and Heber area to make contacts and
introduce the officer to anyone who would provide illicit drugs
(R. 97 at 81).
Scott came into contact with defendant in the first
week of September 1984 (R. 97 at 5), and defendant that day took
Scott's number following a conversation regarding defendant
supplying Scott with drugs (R. 97 at 14). Officer Hansen was
subsequently told by Scott that he had come in contact with
defendant who was dealing a lot of cocaine (R. 97 at 82). The
officer then conducted a controlled buy of illicit drugs through
Scott at the place defendant was residing on September 5th, 1984
(R. 97 at 83). The charge from this purchase was later dropped
because Scott couldn't be found to testify after the three-and-ahalf -year time lapse.
Officer Hansen, who made the buys for which defendant
was charged on September 24, and October 11, 1984, first met
defendant on or about September 28, 1984 (R. 97 at 23, 30, 81).
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At that time the sale of drugs to Officer Hansen was discussed
and defendant said he could supply the drugs and would consider
doing so (R. 97 at 30-33).

A few days later when the officer

next saw defendant, defendant sold drugs to the officer resulting
in the charges for which he was found guilty (R. 97 at 156-159).
Additional pertinent facts contained in the record will
be set out in the individual arguments below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A reviewing court, under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure made applicable to criminal appeals, should
not disrupt the finding of the trial court unless the reviewing
court is convinced a mistake has been made.

The purpose behind

this strict standard of reversal is based upon the presumption
that the finder of fact is in the better position to observe
witness demeanor during testimony and give appropriate weight to
the facts brought to light at trial.
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court
erred in determining that no entrapment existed in the procuring
of evidence against defendant.

Neither Scott nor the officer

involved in procuring illicit drugs from defendant used methods
which violate existing standards of the fair and honorable
administration of justice.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS REVIEWING COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL
COURT DETERMINATION OF THE ENTRAPMENT ISSUE
PURSUANT TO RULE 52(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE MADE APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL
CASES.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1978), defines the
defense of entrapment:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
co-operation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
The legislature's enactment of § 76-2-303(1) reflects
an adoption of the objective view of entrapment.
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979).

State v.

The objective view of

entrapment focuses on whether the governmental conduct in the
matter comports with a fair and honorable administration of
justice.

Id., at 499-500;

(Utah App. 1987);

State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 318

State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah App.

1988) cert, denied State v. Wynia, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
It has long been recognized that to apprehend persons
who engage in illegal business activities, such as dealing in
narcotics, the police must use deceptive methods.
are acceptable as being fair and honorable.

Such methods

In State v.

Bridwell, 566 P.2d 1232, 1233 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court,
quoting the trial judge, stated:

5-

I think it's very clear that, you know,
it's not like a person who is dealing in
narcotics goes out and solicits his wares,
solicits purchases in the community like
other merchants do; I mean, these are covert
operations. And so the police and the
sheriff use covert methods in order to
attempt to bring these things to a halt.
In State v. Kourbelasf 621 P.2d 1238, 1239 (Utah 1980),
this concept was reiterated when the Court stated that "[i]t is
well known that, due to the secretive nature of trafficking in
drugs, it is common practice to use undercover agents to
investigate such activity.

Unless there is an abuse or

imposition, that procedure is recognized as legitimate."
(Citations omitted).
Recognizing that undercover work is a legitimate means
to use in investigating illegal operations, the determination of
how far the undercover operations can go and not become
entrapment is a question of fact for the trial court to
determine.

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(1987), provides in part: "Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."

The Supreme Court in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,

192 (Utah 1987), expressly stated that Rule 52(a) applies in
criminal cases.
The question for this Court under Rule 52(a) "is not
whether it would have made the findings the trial court did, but
whether 'on the entire evidence [it] is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"
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State v

Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258, n. 5 (19

), quoting Zenith Radio

Corp, v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 345 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct.
1565, 1576, 23 L.Ed. 2d 129 (1969).
The entrapment defense raised by defendant in the
instant case rests largely upon defendant's own testimony of the
factual events leading to his arrest for drug distribution.

As

the record of the proceedings in the trial court shows,
defendant's credibility was effectively questioned by his own
admissions and his contradictory testimony.

Defendant's

admission that he would lie to get out of trouble exemplifies his
lack of credibility (R. 97 at 51-53).

At the entrapment hearing,

defendant testified that Mr. Benatino was his sole source of
cocaine.

This testimony conflicts with previous admissions made

by defendant to his arresting officer regarding his source of
illicit drugs. At the time of arrest, defendant swore he was
telling the arresting officer the truth when he gave various
names of persons who supplied him with drugs (R. 97 at 50).
Defendant also testified to using an alias, Jacob Larimore, to
avoid being detected and caused to face the federal charges
pending against him in Colorado (R. 97 at 43-44).
Another apparent inconsistency in defendant's
testimony, affecting his credibility, are his statements
concerning contacts with Scott from the first of September to
about September 25th, 1984. Defendant initially testified that
Scott contacted him by phone as many as ten times up to September
25th and that defendant responded to these contacts by saying he
could not supply the drugs (R. 97 at 15-16).
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Only minutes later,

on direct examination, defendant testified that he first sold
cocaine to Scott on September 16th of 1984, contradictory to his
previous testimony that he told Scott, on each occasion through
September, that he could not supply drugs (R. 97 at 84).
Beyond the established facts raising questions as to
defendant's credibility lies the substance of his testimony which
also requires examination to determine credibility.

Defendant

testifies that he began supplying drugs by the gram in midSeptember, that by the end of the next month he had enough
credibility with his supplier to procure cocaine on credit, and
that he could procure as much as a few kilos at one time (R. 97
at 57-58).

He also increased a zero client base to the point of

supplying almost everyone he knew with drugs (R. 97 at 59). The
believability of such a fantastic story must be carefully
considered.
The credibility of defendant's other witnesses also
needs evaluation.

All of the defense witnesses who testified as

to the circumstances were shown to have strong biases in the
case.

Daniel Christians and Jan Beeman were arrested for illicit

drug sales as a result of the same undercover work of Scott and
Officer Hansen which resulted in defendant's arrest.

Both of

these witnesses, along with Lewis Sadleir, were at the time of
the arrests and during the hearing, good friends of the
defendant.

The final defense witness, Edward Dawson along with

his wife, were arrested for selling drugs to Officer Hansen
during the undercover operation.

The couple also brought a

federal suit for 2.5 million dollars against the officer in 1985
which was summarily dismissed in the officer's favor.
-8-

Defendant and the witnesses called in his behalf should
be closely scrutinized to determine the credibility and weight
that should be given to their testimonies.

Judge Brian was free

to disbelieve representations made by defendant and the other
defense witnesses in their testimony because of these credibility
questions and biases which were brought to light.

Evaluations as

to witness credibility are effectively made by the trier of fact
who can see the demeanor of witnesses.

Because of the trial

court's superior opportunity to observe the witnesses, this Court
should defer to Judge Brian's determination of the issues
involved in this case.
POINT II
THE FACTS BROUGHT TO LIGHT AT TRIAL FAIL TO
ESTABLISH ANY BREACH OF FAIR AND HONORABLE
JUSTICE BY THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES INVOLVED
IN THE ARREST OF DEFENDANT.
In reviewing matters involving factual sufficiency of
evidence questions, the Supreme Court has determined that the
reviewing courts should review the evidence and all inferences
which may be reasonably drawn from those facts in a light most
favorable to the verdict.
1986).

State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah

Such a standard of review should also be used in the case

before this Court, although the facts in any light establish the
inadequacy of defendant's entrapment claim.
Defendant rests his defense primarily on language often
cited in entrapment cases which was first used by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 at 503;
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close
personal friendship, or offers of inordinate
-9-

sums of money, are examples, depending on an
evaluation of the circumstances in each case,
of what might constitute prohibited police
conduct. In evaluating the course of conduct
between the government representative and the
defendant, the transactions leading up to the
offense, the interaction between the agent
and the defendant, and the response to the
inducements of the agent, are all to be
considered in judging what the effect of the
governmental agent's conduct would be on a
normal person.
Defendant has not established in the present case the existence
of any of the specific instances stated in Taylor as examples of
what might amount to prohibited police conduct.

As the court

record shows, defendant knew Scott, to whom he first sold drugs,
for at most a week prior to selling him drugs (R. 97 at 45-48).
In finding entrapment in the Taylor case, the Court
found that the agent who made the controlled buys from the
defendant had an intimate personal relationship developed over a
substantial period of time with the defendant.

The Court also

determined that the defendant procured the drugs for the agent
solely because he believed her to be suffering from drug
withdrawal and that he could help alleviate that suffering.

The

agent also had a financial interest in each arrest she aided the
police with, because she was paid per arrest.

She had a motive

to get anyone she could to supply her with drugs to earn money
for being an informant.
In the instant case, defendant, by his own admission,
initially sold drugs to the police agent because of the
opportunity to make money, and not because of any close
relationship with the agent whom he had met only days earlier (R.
97 at 25). Defendant, subsequent to the initial sale to Scott,
-10-

suggests that he supplied Scott with drugs because Scott would
have to get the drugs somewhere.

Defendant claims to have had

humanitarian motivates in continuing to supply Scott with drugs,
because he could control how much Scott consumed by selling the
drugs to him.

Such alleged motives for supplying drugs to Scott

are interesting but not persuasive.

They have little to do with

the reasons given by defendant for supplying drugs to Scott—to
make a profit (R. 97 at 25, 49-50).
Under the Taylor language used by defendant, the only
other claim would be the offering of "inordinate" amounts of
money.

Defendant testifies that his share in his initial

admitted sale to Scott was to amount to about $350 but he
received only $150 (R. 97 at 25). Either amount is rarely
considered an inordinate sum of money, especially in the drug
business.

Defendant may base his argument on the assumption that

a lot of money can be made on drug sales, but this inducement
comes from the illicit drug market and not from Scott.

Having

established that the specifics enumerated in Taylor are not
present in the instant case, the focus of the argument turns to
the circumstances as a the whole.
In State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Ut. App. 1988), cert.
denied State v. Wynia, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), the undercover
officer initiated the conversation regarding drugs with the
defendant and this Court determined that that fact did not
constitute entrapment.

The Court continued on to reiterate the

Supreme Court's position of condemning personalized high pressure
tactics.

Id, at 670.
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State v, Spraque, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), and State v
Kourbelasf 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), to allow a finding of
entrapment.

These cases differ from the instant case, however.

Both Sprague and Kourbelas involved undercover agents who
pursued, at great lengths for a long period of time, specific
persons.

Such persistent pursuit was not a fair and honorable

administration of justice.

These defendants were pursued to the

point of being cornered into drugs sales when they were not ready
and willing to commit the offense.
In the instant case, Scott knew defendant only a week
or less when defendant sold him drugs, a much shorter time than
was involved in Spraque or Kourbelas.

On the first occasion that

the defendant met Scott, they had a conversation concerning the
possibility of defendant supplying Scott with drugs, and
defendant took Scott's name and phone number (R. 97 at 13-14).
The number of times Scott gave the defendant the opportunity to
supply him with drugs is a matter unresolved even in defendant's
testimony and of little importance considering the length of time
Scott knew defendant before an illicit drug relationship evolved.
The testimony of the officer involved established that
the first sale of drugs to Scott by defendant occurred on
September 5, 1984. At this time, the officer conducted a
controlled buy using Scott (R. 97 at 82-83).

Defendant testified

that he first met Scott in the first week of September (R. 97 at
5).

From the testimony, defendant started supplying drugs to

Scott the first week and possibly the first day he knew Scott

-12-

The circumstances and Scott's conduct do not approach
the persistent pursuit present in other cases in which entrapment
has been found.

Although the controlled buy does not constitute

one of the buys used to charge defendant, it is important to
establish the fact Scott merely afforded defendant, who was ready
and willing to commit an offense, with the opportunity to do so.
Scott's actions were within the limits constituting the fair and
honorable administration of justice.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) states that conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.

In State v. Crippsf 692 P.2d 747 (Utah

1984), the Supreme Court determined that the objective test
language used in Taylor expressing that inducement to commit an
offense constitutes entrapment when an "average person" would be
persuaded to commit the illegal act can be viewed conversely.
"Converse of the conduct which would 'persuade the average
person' is conduct which would induce only a person engaged in a
habitual course of unlawful conduct for gain or profit" to commit
the unlawful act.

Police conduct that "entraps" only those

"ready and willing to commit the crime" is acceptable and does
not constitute unfair governmental conduct.

Id., at 750.

Defendant in his testimony at trial states he always
had a source of illicit drugs (R. 97 at 56).

He also had a good

working relationship with his source because, according to
defendant's testimony and Officer Hansen's testimony, defendant
went from supplying no cocaine to being able to supply upwards of
two pounds of cocaine in a matter of less than two months (R. 97
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at 56). Defendant also built an extensive clientele quite
rapidly as he states in his testimony, "I sold to just about
everyone I knew in Park City" (R. 97 at 59). Such a statement
shows that defendant did not sell drugs only because of a close
personal relationship with Scott; defendant was ready and willing
to commit an offense that Scott merely afforded him the
opportunity to commit.
POINT III
THE OFFICER MAKING THE DRUG PURCHASES THAT
RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF DEFENDANT, ACTED TO
ADMINISTER JUSTICE FAIRLY AND HONORABLY.
Officer Hansen, in making the buys for which defendant
was convicted, did not know the defendant until he conducted the
controlled buy through Scott on September 5, 1984.

Up until that

time the officer did not know defendant existed and gave no
instructions to Scott regarding his conduct toward the defendant.
Scott's purpose was to introduce the officer to anyone who was
supplying drugs in the Park City area.
In State v. Udell, 728 P.2d at 133, an informant worked
with officers expressly to introduce them to persons involved in
illicit drugs.

The informant in that case introduced the officer

to the defendant at which time the defendant declined to sell the
officer drugs, but later did agree to sell.

In the instant case,

according to the defendant's own testimony, defendant agreed when
he first met the officer to consider selling drugs to him, and in
fact sold drugs to the officer a few days later, the very next
time the two saw each other (R. 97 at 32-36).
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Defendant does not contend that Officer Hansen's
conduct constituted entrapment and for good reason.

Defendant

was already heavily involved in selling drugs to almost everyone
he knew in Park City before he was introduced to Officer Hansen.
Officer Hansen involved himself with the defendant only after
Scott informed him that defendant was involved in supplying a lot
of cocaine.

The conduct of the officer who made the buys for

which defendant was convicted does not constitute entrapment.
CONCLUSION
Scott and the officer involved in the defendant's
arrest and conviction of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a
Controlled Substancer acted to afford the defendant with an
opportunity to commit an offense which he was ready and willing
to commit.

Such conduct is within the just and honorable

administration of justice constituting proper police conduct.
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court to affirm
the lower court's finding of no entrapment and affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

Q

day of February,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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